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Semantic information and artificial intelligence
Anderson de Arau´jo
Abstract For a computational system to be intelligent, it should be able to perform,
at least, basic deductions. Nonetheless, since deductions are, in some sense, equiv-
alent to tautologies, it seems that they do not provide new information. The present
article proposes a measure the degree of semantic informativity of valid deductions
in a dynamic setting. Concepts of coherency and relevancy, displayed in terms of
insertions and deletions on databases, are used to define semantic informativity. In
this way, the article shows that a solution to the problem about the informativity of
deductions provides a heuristic principle to improve the deductive power of compu-
tational systems.
1 Introduction
For Aristotle, “every belief comes either through syllogism or from induction”
(Aristotle (1989)). From that, we can infer that every computational system that
aspires to exhibit characteristics of intelligence needs to have deductive as well as
inductive abilities. With respect to the latter, there are theories that explain why
induction is important for artificial intelligence; for instance, Valiant’s probably ap-
proximately correct semantics of learning (Valiant (1984, 2008)). Nonetheless, as
far as the former is concerned, we have a problem first observed by Hintikka (Hin-
tikka (1973)), which can be stated in the following way:
1. A deduction is valid if, and only if, the conjunction of its premisses, says
φ1, . . . ,φn, implies its conclusion, ψ .
2. In this case, φ1∧·· ·∧φn→ ψ is a tautology, i.e., valid deductions are equivalent
to propositions without information.
3. Therefore, deductions are uninformative.
This was called by Hintikka the scandal of deduction. This is a scandal not only
because it contradicts Aristotle’s maxim that deductions are important for obtaining
beliefs, but, mainly, in virtue of the fact that we actually obtain information via de-
ductions. For this and other reasons, Floridi has proposed a theory of strong seman-
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tic information in which semantic information is true well-formed data (Cf. Floridi
(2004)). From this standpoint, Floridi is capable of explaining why some logical
formulas are more informative than others. If we want to explain why deductions,
not only propositions, are important for knowledge acquisition and intelligent pro-
cessing, we cannot, however, apply Floridi’s theory. The main reason is that it was
designed to measure the static semantic information of the data expressed by propo-
sitions. In contrast, knowledge acquisition and intelligence are dynamic phenomena,
associated in some way to the flow of information.
In the present work, we propose to overcome that limitation by defining a mea-
sure of semantic information in Floridi’s sense, but in the context of a dynamic
perspective about the logical features of databases associated to valid deductions
(Section 2). We will restrict ourselves to first-order deductions and will adopt a se-
mantic perspective about them, which means that deductions will be analyzed in
terms of structures. There is two reasons for that choice. The first is that the scandal
of deduction is usually conceived in terms of structures associated to valid deduc-
tions (Cf. Sequoiah-Grayson (2008)). In other words, we have a problem with the
semantic informativity of deductions. The second reason is technical: databases are
finite structures and so there is, in general, no complete deductive first-order logical
system for finite structures (Cf. Ebbinghaus and Flum (1999)).
Besides that, we impose to ourselves the methodological constraint that a good
approach of semantic informativity should be robust enough to be applicable to real
computational systems. More specifically, we will look for a solution that enables
to link semantic information and artificial intelligence. Because of that, we pro-
pose to measure the degree of semantic informativity of deductions as a dynamic
phenomenon, based on certain explicit definitions of insertions and deletions on
databases. In that context, the concepts of coherency and relevancy will be explained
by the operations of insertion and deletion (Section 3), and so semantic informativ-
ity will be conceived in terms of relevancy and coherency (Section 4). This approach
leads us to a solution the scandal of deduction (Section 4). Moreover, using straight-
forward definitions, we shows that our definition of semantic informativity provides
an immediate heuristic principle to improve the deductive power of computational
systems in semantic terms.
2 Databases
We intend to analyze the semantic informativity obtained via deductions. According
to Floridi, semantic information is true well-defined data (Floridi (2011)). As far as
logic is concerned, we can say that data is in some way expressed by propositions.
In general, deductions are compounded of two or more propositions. Thus, we need
indeed to consider databases, because they are just organized collections of data (Cf.
Kroenke and Auer (2007)). From a logical point of view, the usual notion of database
can, in turn, be understood in terms of the mathematical concept of structure.
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Definition 2.1 A database is a pair D = (A,T ) where A is a finite first-order struc-
ture over a signature S and T is a correct (all propositions in T are true in A) finite
first-order theory about A.
Example 2.1 Let D1 = (A1,T ) be a database with signature
S = ({s, l,a},{C,E,H}), for s = pSa˜o Pauloq, l = pLondonq, a =
pAvenida Paulistaq, C = pCityq, E = pStreetq and H = pTo haveq, such
that A1 = ({s¯, l¯, a¯}, s¯s l¯l , a¯a,{s¯, l¯}C,{a¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(l¯, a¯)}H) and T = {∀x(Cx →
∃yHxy),∀x(Cx∨Ex),¬El,Cs}.
Remark 2.1 In the example 2.1 we have used pαq= β to mean that the symbol β
is a formal representation of the expression α . Besides, Xβ is the interpretation of
β in the structure A and we use a bar above letters to indicate individuals of the
domain of A.
The fact that theory T is correct with respect to A does not exclude, however,
the possibility that our database does not correspond to reality. In the example 2.1,
it is true in A that Hla∧Ea, in words, it is true in A that London has a city called
Avenida Paulista, which, until date of the present paper, it is not true. The theory
T represents the fundamental facts of the database that are took as true, that is to
say, they are the beliefs of the database. It is important to observe that T may not
be complete about A, it is possible that not all true propositions about A are in T ;
example 2.1 shows this.
We turn now to the dynamics of changes in databases that will permit us to
measure semantic informativity. We propose that these changes in the structure of
databases should preserve the truth proposition of their theories through operations
that we call structural operations. The first structural operation consists in put pos-
sibly new objects in the structure of the given database and to interpret a possibly
new symbols in terms of these objects.
Definition 2.2 Let D = (A,T ) be a database over a signature S. An insertion of the
n-ary symbol σ ∈ S′ in D is a database D′ = (A′,T ) where A′ is an structure over
S′ = S∪{σ} with the following properties:
1. A′(τ) = A(τ) for all τ 6= σ such that τ ∈ S;
2. If n = 0, then A′ = A∪{a} and A′(σ) = a, provided that, for all φ ∈ T , A′  φ ;
3. If n > 0, then A′ = A∪{a1, . . . ,an} and A′(σ) = A(σ)∪{(a1, . . . ,an)}, provided
that, for all φ ∈ T , A′  φ .
Example 2.2 Let D1 = (A,T ) be the database of the example 2.1. The database
D2 = (A2,T ) with signature S′ = S∪ {b}, where b = pShaftesbury Avenueq, and
A2 = ({s¯, l¯, a¯}, s¯s, l¯l , a¯a, a¯b,{s¯, l¯}C,{a¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(l¯, a¯)}H) is an insertion of b in
D. On the other hand, D3 = (A3,T ) is an insertion of E in D3 where A3 =
({s¯, l¯, a¯, b¯}, s¯s, l¯l , a¯a, a¯b,{s¯, l¯}C,{a¯, b¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(l¯, a¯)}H) is an S′-structure. Nonethe-
less, for A∗=({s¯, l¯, a¯, b¯}, s¯s, l¯l , a¯a, b¯b,{s¯, l¯}C,{a¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(l¯, a¯)}H), an S′-structure,
we have that D∗ = (A∗,T ) is not an insertion of b in D1 because in this case
A∗ 2 ∀x(Cx∨Ex).
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The example 2.2 shows that it is not necessary to introduce a new object in the
structure of the database to make an insertion (Cf. database D2), it is sufficient to
add a possibly new element in the interpretation of some symbol. On the other hand,
it also shows that it is not sufficient to introduce a new object in the structure of the
database to make an insertion (Cf. database D∗), it is necessary to guarantee that the
beliefs of the database are still true in the new structure.
The second structural operation consists in removing possibly old objects in the
structure of the database and to interpret a possibly new symbol in terms of the
remaining objects in the database.
Definition 2.3 Let D = (A,T ) be a database over a signature S. A deletion of the
n-ary symbol σ ∈ S′, S−{σ} ⊆ S′ ⊆ S, from D is a database D′ = (A′,T ) where A′
is an structure over S′ with the following properties:
1. A′(τ) = A(τ) for all τ 6= σ such that τ ∈ S;
2. If n = 0, A−{A(σ)} ⊆ A′ ⊆ A and A′(σ) ∈ A′, provided that, for all φ ∈ T ,
A′  φ ;
3. If n > 0, A−{a1, . . . ,an} ⊆ A′ ⊆ A and A′(σ) = A(σ)−{(a1, . . . ,an)}, provided
that, for all φ ∈ T , A′  φ .
Example 2.3 Let D1 = (A,T ) be the database of the exam-
ple 2.1. The database D′2 = (A
′
2,T ) with signature S and A
′
2 =
({s¯, l¯, a¯}, a¯s, l¯l , a¯a,{s¯, l¯}C,{a¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(l¯, a¯)}H) is a deletion of s in D.
On the other hand, D′3 = (A
′
3,T ) is a deletion of H in D
′
2 where
A′3 = ({s¯, l¯, a¯}, a¯s, l¯l , a¯a,{s¯, l¯}C,{a¯}E ,{(l¯, a¯)}H) is a S-structure. Nonetheless,
for A′4 = ({l¯, a¯}, a¯s, l¯l , a¯a,{l¯}C,{a¯}E ,{(l¯, a¯)}H), an structure over the signature
S, we have that D′4 = (A4,T ) is not a deletion of C in D
′
2 because in this case, in
despite of A′4  φ for φ ∈ T , we have that D′4(H) 6= D′2(H). Note, however, that D′4
is a deletion of C in D′3.
Example 2.3 illustrates that the restriction A−{a1, . . . ,an} ⊆ A′ ⊆ A means that
we can delete at most just the elements of the domain that we remove in some way
from the interpretation of the symbol that we are considering in the deletion.
Insertions and deletions on databases are well known primitive operations (Cf.
Kroenke and Auer (2007)). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, they have
being conceived as undefined notion. Here we have proposed, however, a logical
conception about databases and we have defined explicitly the operations of inser-
tion and deletion sufficient in order to analyze the importance of semantic infor-
mation to artificial intelligence. In Arau´jo (2014), a more strict notion of structural
operation is given.
3 Coherency and relevancy
In this section, we propose a dynamic perspective about coherency and relevancy.
This approach will permit us to evaluate how many structural operations a propo-
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sition requires to become true. We will use these concepts to define the semantic
informativity in the next section.
Definition 3.1 An update D¯ of an S-database D is a finite or infinite sequence D¯ =
(Di : 0 < i ≤ ω) where D1 = D and each Di+1 is a insertion or deletion in Di. An
update D¯ of D is coherent with a proposition φ if D¯ = (D1,D2, . . . ,Dn) and An  φ ;
otherwise, D¯ is said to be incoherent with φ .
Example 3.1 Let D1 be the database of the example 2.1 and D2 be the databases
of the example 2.2. The sequence D¯ = (D1,D2) is an update of D coherent with
Eb and Hlb. Let D1 be the database of the example 2.1 and D′2, D
′
3 and D
′
4 be the
databases of the example 2.3. The sequence D¯′ = (D1,D′2,D
′
3,D
′
4) is an update of D
coherent with Es∧¬Hsa but not with s = a because the last proposition is false in
A′4 = ({l¯, a¯}, a¯s, l¯l , a¯a,{l¯}C,{a¯}E ,{(l¯, a¯)}H).
In other words, an update for a proposition φ is a sequence of changes in a given
database that produces a structure in which φ is true. In this way, we can measure
the amount of coherency of propositions.
Definition 3.2 Let D¯ = (D1,D2, . . . ,Dn) be an update of the database D. If D¯ is
coherent with φ , we define the coherency of φ with D¯ by
HD¯(φ) =
min{m≤ n : Am  φ}
∑mi=1 i
but if D¯ is incoherent with φ , then
HD¯(φ) = 0.
A proposition φ is said to be coherent with the database D if HD¯(φ)> 0 for some
update D¯, otherwise, φ is incoherent with D.
Remark 3.1 In the definition of coherency the denominator ∑mi=1 i is used in to or-
der to normalize the definition (the coherency is a non-negative real number smaller
than or equal to 1).
Example 3.2 The coherence of Eb and Hlb with the update D¯ of the example 3.1
is the same 2/3, i.e., HD¯(Eb) = HD¯(Hlb)≈ 0.66 and so HD¯(Eb∧Hlb) = HD¯(Eb∨
Hlb)≈ 0.66. On the other hand, with respect to the coherence of Es,¬Hsa and¬s=
a and with the update D¯′ of the example 3.1, we have HD¯′(Es)≈ 0.66, HD¯′(¬Hsa) =
0.4, HD¯′(s = a) = 0 and so HD¯′(Es∧¬Hsa) = 0.4 but HD¯′(Es∧ s = a) = 0.
The example 3.2 exhibits that, given an update, we can have different proposi-
tions with different coherency, but we can have different propositions with the same
coherency as well. The fact that so HD¯(Eb) = HD¯(Hlb) = HD¯(Eb∧Hlb) ≈ 0.66
shows that concept of coherency is not a measure of the complexity of propo-
sitions. It seems natural to think that Eb∧Hlb is in some sense more complex
than Eb and Hlb. Here we do not have this phenomena. Moreover, the fact that
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HD¯(Eb∧Hlb) = HD¯(Eb∨Hlb) ≈ 0.66 makes clear that, since some propositions
have a given coherency, many others will have the same coherency. Another inter-
esting point is that HD¯′(Es)> HD¯′(¬Hsa) but HD¯′(¬Hsa) = HD¯(Eb∧Hlb)≈ 0.33.
This reflects the fact that updates are sequences. First, we had made Es coherent
with D¯′, and later ¬Hsa we made coherent with D¯. When ¬Hsa is coherent with D¯′
there is nothing more to be done, as far as the conjunction Es∧¬Hsa is concerned.
These remarks show that our approach is very different from the one given in (Cf.
D’Agostino and Floridi (2009)). It is not an analysis of some concept of complexity
associated to semantic information. In Arau´jo (2014), we do an analysis of infor-
mational complexity similar to one presented here about coherency, but this two
concepts are different. In further works, we will examine the relation between them.
For now, we are interested in artificial intelligence. With respect to that, we can
obtain an important result in the direction of a solution to the scandal of deduction.
Proposition 3.1 For every database D = (A,T ) and update D¯ coherent with φ ,
HD¯(φ) = 1 for every φ such that A  φ . In particular, for φ a tautology in the
language of D, HD¯(φ) = 1, but if φ is not in the language of D, 0 < HD(φ)< 1. In
contrast, for every contradiction ψ in any language, HD¯(ψ) = 0 for every update D¯
of D.
In virtue of our focus in this paper is conceptual, we will not provide proofs
here (Cf. Arau´jo (2014)). By now, we only observe that if a tautology has symbols
different from the ones in the language of the database, it will be necessary to make
some changes in order to make that tautology become true. In contrast, a proposition
is incoherent with a database when there is no way to change it in order to become
the proposition true and, for this reason, contradictions are never coherent.
We turn now to the concept of relevancy. For that, let us introduce a notation.
Consider (φ1,φ2, . . . ,φn) a valid deduction of formulas over the signature S whose
premisses are the set Γ = {φ1,φ2, . . . ,φm} and its conclusion is φ = φn. We represent
this deduction by Γ {φ}.
Definition 3.3 Let D¯ = (D1, . . . ,Dn) be an update of the S-database D = (A,T )
coherent with φ . The relevant premises of the deduction Γ {φ} with respect to D¯
are the premises that are true in Dn but are not logical consequences of T , i.e., the
propositions in the set D¯(Γ ) of all ψ ∈ Γ for which Dn  ψ but T 2 ψ .
Example 3.3 Let D¯′′ = (D1). Then, D¯′′({Ea}{∃xEx}) = {Ea}. Now let us
consider a more complex example. Let D¯ = (D1,D2) be the update of 3.1.
In this case, D¯({∀x(Cx → ¬Ex),Cb}{¬Eb}) is not defined because ¬Eb is
false in A2 = ({s¯, l¯, a¯}, s¯s, l¯l , a¯a, a¯b,{s¯, l¯}C,{a¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(l¯, a¯)}H). Nonetheless, con-
sider the new update D¯′′′ = (D1,D2,D3,D4,D5) such that D3 is the insertion
in example 2.2, A4 = ({s¯, l¯, a¯, b¯}, s¯s, l¯l , a¯a, b¯b,{s¯, l¯}C,{a¯, b¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(l¯, a¯)}H) and
A5 = ({s¯, l¯, a¯, b¯}, s¯s, l¯l , a¯a, b¯b,{s¯, l¯}C,{a¯}E ,{(s¯, a¯),(l¯, a¯)}H). Then, D¯′′′({∀x(Cx →
¬Ex),Cb}{¬Eb}) = {∀x(Cx→¬Ex)}.
In our definition of relevant premises, we have adopted a semantic perspective
oriented to conclusion of deductions: the relevancy of the premises of a deductions
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are determined according to an update in which its conclusion is true. Example
3.3 illustrates that point, because it is only possible to evaluate the relevancy of
{∀x(Cx→ ¬Ex),Cb}{¬Eb} in an update like D¯′ in which the conclusion ¬Eb is
true. Another point to be noted is that we have chosen a strong requirement about
what kind of premises could be relevant: the relevant premises are just the non-
logical consequences of our believes.
Definition 3.4 Let D be an S-database. If D¯ is an update of D coherent with φ , the
relevancy RD¯(Γ ) of the deduction Γ {φ} in D¯ is the cardinality of D¯(Γ ) divided by
the cardinality of Γ ,i.e.,
RD¯(Γ ) =
|D¯(Γ )|
|Γ | ,
but, if D¯ is incoherent with φ , then RD¯(Γ ) = 0.
Example 3.4 We have showed in example 3.3 that RD¯′′({Ea}{∃xEx}) = 1 and
RD¯′′′({∀x(Cx→¬Ex),Cb}{¬Eb}) = 0.5.
In the example above, RD¯′′′({∀x(Cx→¬Ex),Cb}{¬Eb}) = 0.5 show us that we
can have valid deductions with non-null relevancy in extended languages. Nonethe-
less, the fact RD¯′′({Ea}{∃xEx}) = 1 shows that is not necessary to consider ex-
tended languages to find deductions with non-null relevancy. Thus, we have a result
that will be central to our solution of the scandal of deduction.
Proposition 3.2 For every database D = (A,T ), update D¯ of D and deduction
Γ {φ}, if T is a complete theory of A or Γ = , then RD¯(Γ ) = 0. In particular,
tautologies and contradictions have null relevancy.
Therefore, deductions can be relevant only when we do not have a complete
theory of the structure of the database. Moreover, as deductions, isolated logical
facts (tautologies and contradictions) have no relevance. This means that we have at
hand a deductive notion of relevancy.
4 Semantic informativity and artificial intelligence
Having at hand the dynamic concepts of coherence and relevance, now it seems
reasonable to say that the more coherent the conclusion of a valid deduction is the
more informative it is, but the more relevant its premises are the more information
they provide. We use this intuition to define the semantic informativity of valid
deductions.
Definition 4.1 The semantic informativity ID¯(Γ {φ}) of a valid deduction Γ {φ} in
the update D¯ of the database D is defined by
ID¯(Γ {φ}) = RD¯(Γ )HD¯(φ).
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The idea behind the definition of semantic informativity of a valid deduction
Γ {φ} is that ID¯(Γ {φ}) is directly proportional to the relevance of its premisesΓ and
to the coherency of its conclusion φ . Given Γ {φ} and an update D¯ of D, if we have
RD¯(Γ ) = 0 or HD¯(φ) = 0, then the semantic informativity of Γ {φ} is zero, it does
not matter how Γ {φ} is. Now, if HD¯(φ) = 0, then, by definition, RD¯(Γ ) = 0. Thus,
if the computational system, whose database is D, intends to evaluate ID¯(Γ {φ})
for some update D¯, it should look for a D¯ coherent with φ , i.e., a D¯ for which
HD¯(φ)> 0. In other words, our analysis of the semantic informativity is oriented to
the conclusion of valid deductions - as we did with respect to relevancy.
Example 4.1 Given the updates D¯′′ and D¯′′′ of the example 3.3. Then,
ID¯′′({Ea}{∃xEx}) = 1 ·1 = 1 and ID¯′′′({∀x(Cx→¬Ex),Cb}{¬Eb}) = 0.5 ·5/15≈
0.17.
In the definition of ID¯(Γ {φ}) the relevancy of the premisses, RD¯(Γ ), is a factor of
the coherency of the conclusion, HD¯(φ). For that reason, if a computational systems
intends to evaluate the semantic informativity of a proposition φ , it should measure
HD¯(φ) and, then, multiply it by its relevancy RD¯({φ}). Hence, the semantic infor-
mativity of a proposition φ can be conceived as a special case of the informativity
of the valid deduction {φ}{φ}.
Definition 4.2 The semantic informativity ID¯(φ) of a proposition φ in the update D¯
of the database D is defined by
ID¯(φ) = ID¯({φ}{φ}).
Example 4.2 Considering the update D¯′′ of example 3.3, we have that ID¯′′′(Ea) =
ID¯′′′(∃xEx) = 1 but ID¯′′′(Ea→ ∃xEx) = 0. If we consider the update D¯′′′ of exam-
ple 3.3, we have that also have that ID¯′′′((∀x(Cx→ ¬Ex)∧Cb)→ ¬Eb) = 0, but
ID¯′′′(∀x(Cx→¬Ex)) = 1, ID¯′′′(Cb) = 0 and ID¯′′′(¬Eb) = 0.4.
Example 4.2 shows that semantic informativity measures how many structural
operations we do in order to obtain the semantic information of a proposition. It is
for that reason that ID¯′′′(Cb) = 0, false well-defined data is not semantically infor-
mative; it should be true. In other words, it is a measure of semantic information
in Floridi’s sense (Cf. Floridi (2011)). From this, we can solve Hintikka’ scandal of
deduction.
Proposition 4.1 For every valid deduction ψ1, . . . ,ψn  φ in the language of D,
ID¯((ψ1 ∧ ·· · ∧ψn)→ φ) = 0 for every update D¯. Nonetheless, if ψ1, . . . ,ψn  φ is
not in the language of D, ID¯((ψ1 ∧ ·· · ∧ψn)→ φ) > 0 for D¯ coherent with (ψ1 ∧
·· ·∧ψn)→ φ .
This proposition is a solution to the scandal of deduction in two different senses.
First, it shows that we can have an informative valid deduction {ψ1, . . . ,ψn}{φ}
whose associated conditional ψ1, . . . ,ψn→ φ is uninformative, for example, the one
given in example 4.1. Second, it shows that it is not completely true that tautologies
are always uninformative. When we need to interpret new symbols, we have some
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semantic information, notably, the one sufficient to perceive that we have a true
proposition - this is a natural consequence of our approach.
From this standpoint, we are going to make a simple, but important, remark to
establish a relationship between semantic informativity and artificial intelligence.
Given an update D¯ = (D1, . . . ,Dn) of D = (A,T ) and a deduction {φ}{φ}, ei-
ther RD¯({φ}) = 0 or RD¯({φ}) = 1. If RD¯({φ}) = 0, then either T  φ or Dn 2 φ . If
T  φ , then there is an update D¯′ of D such that HD¯′(φ) = 1, notably, D¯′ = (D).
If Dn 2 φ , then HD¯′(φ) = 0. Finally, if RD¯({φ}) = 1, then T 2 φ as well as
Dn  φ and so ID¯(φ) = HD¯(φ) > 0. Therefore, we conclude that the relevancy of
a proposition does not determine its coherency. On the other hand, if HD¯(φ) = 0,
then RD¯({φ}) = 0, but if HD¯(φ) > 0, this neither necessarily imply that either
RD¯({φ}) = 1 nor RD¯({φ}) = 0, because this depends whether T  φ . Hence, we
also conclude that the coherency of a proposition does not determine its relevancy
too. Combining this two conclusions we obtain a general conclusion: the semantic
informativity of propositions cannot be determined by its coherency or relevancy
alone. This reinforces our definition of semantic informativity. It is not an arbitrary
definition, in fact semantic informativity is a relationship between both, coherence
and relevancy. What is the moral for artificial intelligence?
In the studies of pragmatics (a linguistics’ area of research), Wilson and Sperber
formulated two principles about relevant information in human linguistic practice:
“Relevance may be assessed in terms of cognitive effects and processing effort: (a) other
things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input,
the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time; (b) other things being
equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the
individual at that time.” Wilson and Sperber (2004)[p.608]
Our general conclusion that semantic informativity of propositions cannot be de-
termined by its coherency or relevancy alone shows that the two Wilson and Sper-
ber’s principles (a) and (b) are in fact parts of one general principle associated to
semantic information. Let us put that in precise terms.
Definition 4.3 The changes that a proposition φ requires are the structural oper-
ations, insertions and deletions, that generate an update D¯ of a given database
D = (A,T ) coherent with φ . A proposition φ is new if φ is not false in A and is not
a consequence of the theory T of the database D = (A,T ).
Proposition 4.2 The less changes a new proposition requires, the more informative
it is.
Proposition 4.2 is a direct consequence of definition 4.2. As we have showed that
our definition 4.2 is not, in turn, arbitrary, this means that 4.2 is not arbitrary. 4.2 is a
reformulation of the Wilson and Sperber’s principle (b) above, but it is important to
note the differences between them. Wilson and Sperber’s principle (b) is an empiri-
cal matter under discussion among linguistics (Cf. Wilson and Sperber (2004)). The
proposition 4.2 is a reformulation of our definition of semantic informativity. Us-
ing the same strategy, we can also obtain a formal version of Wilson and Sperber’s
principle (a).
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Definition 4.4 If a valid deduction Γ {φ} has non-null relevancy in a given update
D¯ and its conclusion φ is new, then the results that it produces are its relevant
premisses and its conclusion, i.e., D¯(Γ )∪{φ}, but if φ is not new, then the results
that it produces are just its relevant premisses D¯(Γ ).
Proposition 4.3 The more results a valid deduction produces, the more informative
it is.
We can, then, combine these two propositions in an schematic one.
Proposition 4.4 (Principle of semantic informativity) To increase semantic in-
formativity, an intelligent agent, with respect to its database, should perform little
changes and produce big results.
In recent works (Cf. Valiant (2008)), Valiant have argued that one of the most
important challenges in artificial intelligence is that of understanding how computa-
tional systems that acquire and manipulate commonsense knowledge can be created.
With respect to that point, he explains that some of the lessons from his PAC theory
is this:
“We note that an actual system will attempt to learn many concepts simultaneously. It will
succeed for those for which it has enough data, and that are simple enough when expressed
in terms of the previously reliably learned concepts that they lie in the learnable class.”
Valiant (2008)[p.6]
We can read Valiant’s perspective in terms of the principle of semantic infor-
mativity. The simple propositions are the more coherent propositions, the ones that
requires little changes in the database. To have enough data is to have propositions
sufficient to deduce another propositions and this means that deductions with more
results are preferable. Of course, Valiant’s remark relies on PAC, a theory about
learnability, not on deductivity. It is necessary to develop further works to make
clear the relationship between this two concepts. Since we have designed a concept
of semantic informativity implementable in real systems, it seems, however, that the
possibility of realizing that is open.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed to measure the degree of semantic informativity of deductions by
means of dynamic concepts of relevancy and coherency. In an schematic form, we
can express our approach in the following way:
Semantic informativity = Relevancy × Coherency.
In accordance with this conception, we showed how the scandal of deduction can
be solved. Our solution is that valid deductions are not always equivalent to propo-
sitions without information. It is important to note, however, that this problem is
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not solve in its totality, because here we have analyzed semantic information only
from the point of view of relevancy and coherency. Another crucial concept associ-
ated to semantic information is the notion of complexity. In Arau´jo (2014), we treat
this subject, but a complete analysis of the relation among semantic information,
relevance, coherency and complexity is necessary.
In this respect, we have derived a principle of semantic informativity that, when
applied to computational intelligent systems, means that an intelligent agent should
make few changes in its database and obtain big results. This seems an obvious
observation, but it is not. The expressions “few changes” and “big results” here have
a technical sense which opens the possibility of relating semantic information and
artificial intelligence in a precise way. Indeed, there is a lot of possible developments
to be explored, we would like to indicate three.
The first one is to investigate the connections between semantic informativity
and machine learning, specially, with respect to Valiant’s semantic theory of learn-
ing (PAC). As in Valiant’s PAC, we could establish probability distributions on the
possible updates and delineate goals for them - the principle of semantic informa-
tivity could play an important role in this point. Moreover, we can also introduce
computational complexity constrains to agent semantic informativity. Thus, it will
be possible to analyze how many efficient updates (time and space requirements
bounded by a function of the proposition size) are necessary for a given proposition
to be coherent with the database. In this way, we will be able, for example, to com-
pare the learnability of the concepts which occur in propositions, in the Valiant’s
sense (Cf. Valiant (1984)), with respect to their semantic information.
The second possible line of research is to develop a complete dynamic theory of
the semantic informativity by incorporating belief revision in the line of AGM the-
ory (Cf. Alchourro´n et al (1985)). In the present paper, the believes of the database
have been maintained fixed, but a more realistic approach should incorporate revi-
sion of believes. For example, if we consider distributed systems, the agents proba-
bly will have some different beliefs. In this case, it will be necessary to analyze the
changes of semantic information, conflicting data and so on.
The last point to be explored, but no less important, is to analyze the relation-
ship between our dynamic perspective about semantic information and other static
approaches, mainly, with respect to Floridi’s theory of strong semantic information
(Floridi (2004)). It is important to observe that we have proposed a kind of hegelian
conception about semantic information, according to which semantic informativity
is analyzed in semantic terms, whereas, for example, Floridi’s conception is kantian,
in the sense that it analyzes the relationship between propositions and the world
in order to understand the transcendental conditions of semantic information (Cf.
Floridi (2011)). Our approach seems to be a hegelian turn in the philosophy of in-
formation similar to what Brandom did with respect to the philosophy of language
(Cf. Brandom (1989)).
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